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1 Introduction 
A web service is a software system identified by a URL, whose public interfaces and 
bindings are defined and described using XML. Its definition can be discovered by other 
software systems. These systems may then interact with the web service in a manner 
prescribed by its definition, using XML-based messages conveyed by internet protocols. 
This definition has been published by the world-wide-web consortium W3C, in the web 
services architecture document (Booth et al., 2004). 
The web service model consists of three entities, the service provider, the service 
registry and the service consumer. The key requirements for any service provider are: 
interoperability, security and performance. Most researchers focus on a common belief is 
that interoperability of web service must come along with considerable performance 
penalty (Georgiadis and Pimenidis, 2007). One common finding is that all three could be 
affected by the automatic choice of partners in forming a web service and that all three 
could mutually affect each other (Casola et al., 2007). 
The most attractive feature of web service is its interoperability in a heterogeneous 
environment, and exposing existing applications as a web service increases their reach 
to different client types. Security measures are not something that can be added in 
a certain system’s architecture, without having thought of them and design them at the 
very early stages (Chen et al., 2007). The integration of context into web service 
composition/transaction ensures that the requirements and constraints on these web 
service (either security- or interoperability-oriented) are taken into account. Context 
may support web service in their decision-making process when it comes to whether 
accepting or rejecting participation in a transaction (Casola et al., 2007; Georgiadis and 
Pimenidis, 2007). 
2 Web services and security 
2.1 Architecture layers and relative specifications 
The high-level architecture of systems exploiting web service technology is essentially a 
stack of service-oriented capabilities. The bottom layers (namely transport and messaging 
layers) present its capabilities to cope with various transport protocols to communicate 
between a service and a requester, as well as to deal with messages. Major messaging 
specifications are XML (it provides the interoperable format to describe message content 
between web service), SOAP (it defines an extensible enveloping mechanism) and web 
service-addressing (it provides an interoperable way of identifying message senders and 
receivers; Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Web service architecture 
Source: Weerawarana et al. (2006). 
The next layer, the description layer, deals with the description of services in terms of 
binding mechanisms and functions supported, as well as the quality of services of these 
functions. WSDL is an XML format for describing network services. It uses metadata to 
provide a set of endpoints that operate on messages containing either document-oriented 
or procedure-oriented information. Although WSDL describes what a service can do by 
providing a definition of the business interface (including business operations such as 
debit/credit/transfer), it does not provide information about how the service delivers its 
interface or what the service expects of the caller when it uses the service. The web 
service-policy specifications deal with this kind of issues and provide an extensible 
framework for web service constraints and conditions that allows a uniform expression of 
the available options. Thus, when multiple choices are possible, it is capable to provide 
support for determining valid intersections of conditions and constraints. Moreover, web 
service consumers and providers are not confused with multiple domain-specific 
mechanisms, because policy specifications enable constraints and conditions associated 
with various domains (e.g. security, transactions, etc.) to be composeable. 
These issues are certainly of critical importance regarding security concerns, and so 
web service-policy specifications are actually a key security component of the overall 
architecture. To be exact, the actual quality of services (in terms of supporting 
transactions, reliable messaging and security) resides in a separate layer, and is based on 
appropriate parameterisation via policies. Focusing in security-oriented capabilities, we 
have first to mention the web service-reliable messaging specification, which may ensure 
any combination of the following assurances: the messages are delivered in the same 
order in which they were sent, no duplicate messages are delivered and each message that 
is sent is delivered at least one time. 
Making web service interactions reliable in the presence of failures is certainly an 
important issue, but making web service-reliable even when the network, the web service 
itself or both are under possible security attacks requires a specific family of 
specifications, namely the web service-security specifications. 
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Figure 2 The web service-security family of specifications 
Source: Weerawarana et al. (2006). 
2.2 Need for web service security-related specifications 
The web service security-related specifications define the required policies to properly 
secure the web service interactions. Their task is to set the constraints and capabilities of 
a web service, and actually they do not intend to substitute any existing security 
technologies. On the contrary, web service security-related specifications enlarge and 
merge existing security infrastructures and concretely define how these can be used in an 
interoperable way. 
Multi-party and/or multi-hop web service interactions cannot be secure without web 
service security-oriented specifications. Existing technologies, such as SSL/TLS, IPSec 
and HTTP-S, have no end-to-end security or persistency. They are just capable to provide 
in-transit confidentiality and integrity, securing point-to-point connections (e.g. between 
the end user and company’s systems in B2C transactions or between companies’ systems 
in B2B transactions). But, these attributes are lost after the message is delivered, and this 
is surely a problem considering that in web service interactions there are always 
intermediaries placing significant communication issues: although they should not have 
access in general to sensitive data (because they are not always completely trusted), they 
might need to inspect or even alter at least some parts of passing messages (Figure 2). 
Moreover, the variance of intermediaries requests extremely flexibility from web 
service-security means, to accommodate many different security models. Web service 
integrate multiple systems with different security domains and technology, and so there is 
a need for a mechanism to exchange or translate security metadata from one domain to 
another (e.g. the end user is authenticated by a certain company’s system, and this 
authentication information is then propagated trustworthy and meaningfully to other 
companies). 
2.3 Web service-security specifications 
A set of fundamental and conceptual web service security-oriented standards, namely the 
web service-security family of specifications, collectively form a web service-centric 
security framework that facilitates the message-level security required to end-to-end 
protection (Erl, 2004). This web service-security framework acknowledges the fact that 
web service technology is often used to integrate several existing applications available 
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on the network. These applications might be extremely diverse in terms of hardware, 
operating systems, middleware and in their configurations. In addition, they might reside 
in different security domains that have different security policies and are dependent on 
diverse security infrastructure, such as PKI and Kerberos (Weerawarana et al., 2006). 
To solve the problem of translating security information from one system in one 
security domain to another system in another security domain, the web service-security 
framework defines standard syntax and semantics to express the security information, and 
rules to translate it. Specific terminology is used to describe this type of concerns. When 
a service requester makes a request of a service to a provider, it asserts a claim regarding 
its security clearness. It is then up to the service provider to validate this claim. A service 
requester may provide a number of claims to communicate different aspects of its 
security status. This set of claims is contained within a security token. Security tokens 
can be signed with a signing authority, allowing them to be further verified by the 
recipient of the message containing the token (Erl, 2004). Some tokens might be issued 
by a trusted third-party. Web service-security defines a standard XML format for 
transporting security tokens. For example, an X.509 certificate is usually issued by a 
certification authority. In the web service-security model, a trusted third-party is called a 
security token service because one of its tasks is to issue security tokens. The security 
token service might be well-known in a public network, such as an internet certification 
authority, or it might be an infrastructure service within an enterprise’s network. 
Although web service-security framework as it is defined today does not solve all 
issues, it is certainly a firm step in that direction, thanks to its flexibility and extensibility. 
Web service-security helps to solve these problems by defining the following 
(Weerawarana et al., 2006). 
? A standard interoperable format (schema) for transporting security information 
(identity tokens, signature elements, and encryption elements and claims). 
? A set of concrete security policy documents (extensions of web service-policy) that 
allow sites and web service to document their support for web service-security and 
their requirements on callers. For example, a site might use web service-policy to 
document which messages (or parts of messages) must be signed and which 
certificate authorities the site may use. 
? A standard web service interface that web service can use to create, exchange and 
validate security tokens issued by other domains, and that requesters can use to 
translate credentials from one domain into tokens accepted by another domain. 
Thus, the basic aspects of web service-security layers are the following (Chatterjee and 
Webber, 2004; Weerawarana et al., 2006). 
1 Web service-security. SOAP message security. It is built on the SOAP specification 
and specifies how to sign and secure SOAP messages. 
2 Web service-securitypolicy. It specifies a generic format through which to describe 
the security capabilities and requirements for SOAP message senders and receivers 
(both intermediaries and endpoint consumers). Existing corporate security policies 
can be expressed through policy assertions that can subsequently be applied to 
groups of services. 
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3 Web service-trust. It specifies and describes the model for establishing and 
coordinating trust relationships between multiple parties. 
Web service-trust specification is very important, as it actually defines a conceptual 
model for using a web service. A requester examines the web service-securitypolicy 
statements associated with a web service. The policy statements specify the type and 
authority of security tokens that the web service requires for messages it processes. If the 
requester does not possess such acceptable tokens, it must obtain them. One way is to 
contact a security token server that the web service’s policy statements identify as 
acceptable (Weerawarana et al., 2006). 
Web service-trust also defines a model for challenges. Upon receiving a message with 
a security token in it, a service might send a challenge, forcing the requester to 
demonstrate its right to use the token. If the requester passes an X509 certificate, the 
service might respond with a challenge that contains some random data. The requester 
must sign the random data with the private key associated with the certificate, 
demonstrating proof of possession. The challenge model strengthens security by 
eliminating some attacks. 
Web service-trust provides support for specifying key sizes and algorithms in the 
request and response messages. The specification also provides support for passing policy 
information in messages. Each web service endpoint logically implements a trust engine 
that must understand the web service-security and web service-trust model. The trust 
engine of a web service must verify the following. 
? The security token is sufficient to comply with the web service’s policy, and the 
message conforms to the policy (for example, the necessary elements are encrypted 
or signed). 
? The security tokens are proven signatures. 
? The issuers of the security tokens (including all related and ancestral security tokens) 
are trusted by this site to issue the claims they have made. 
The trust engine might need to send tokens to a security token service to exchange them 
for other security tokens, which it can use directly in its evaluation. If the trust engine 
determines that the conditions are met and the requester is authorised to perform the 
operation, the web service can process the web service request within the aforementioned 
trust model. 
The remaining layers of web service-security family are the following (Chatterjee and 
Webber, 2004; Weerawarana et al., 2006). 
1 Web service-secureconversation. It is built on base web service-security and web 
service-trust to specify how web service can manually manage and authenticate 
security contexts. It includes describing how service requesters can authenticate web 
service as well as how web service can authenticate messages from service 
requesters.
2 Web service-federation. It is built on all previous specifications to specify how to 
broker and manage heterogeneous, federated trust contexts. Web service-federation 
itself describes how to implement a federation in a web service world. In particular, 
it focuses on the relationships between parties, and the high-level architecture that 
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supports these relationships. Web service-federation describes how to use the 
existing web service-security building blocks to provide federation functionality, 
including trust, single sign-on (and single sign-off), and attribute management across 
a federation.
3 Web service-privacy. It is built on base web service-security, web service-
securitypolicy and web service-trust to specify a model by which organisations using 
web service can indicate preferences as well as conformance to particular privacy 
policies. 
4 Web service-authorisation. It specifies how access policies for web service are 
specified and managed using a flexible and extensible authorisation language and 
format.
2.4 Web service-security standards: a work in progress 
The solutions to the security challenges are still evolving and so pre-standard 
workarounds to security problems provide a critical aspect of the whole process. Some 
standards (e.g. web service-security, web service-securitypolicy) are mature and can be 
immediately employed. Others are still in development. The advantage of this situation 
lies on the modular character of the web service-* family of security standards: the 
implementations of current standards, the structure of the SOAP message body and the 
structure of the header portions of the messages related to the standards already in use, 
will not be impacted by the later adoption of newly matured standards (Brown, 2007). 
Thus, wherever these industry standards are applicable, appropriate and mature, they 
certainly should be adopted. 
Temporary working solutions for the design problems that these emerging standards 
will eventually address, must be found in the meantime. Undoubtedly, this is the real 
challenge: to address the functional areas for which the standards are not yet full-grown. 
In most cases, web service-security standards require some supporting infrastructure and 
consequently an infrastructure investment in order to employ these standards is essential. 
One of the main areas where web service-security framework needs supplementary 
methods and concepts is related with federating multiple security domains. The term 
federated identity has various meanings. To an individual user, it means the ability to 
associate his various application and system identities with one another. To an enterprise, 
federated identity provides a standardised means for directly providing services for 
trusted third-party users, or those that the business does not manage directly. An 
enterprise associates with others in a federation, such that the identities from one 
enterprise domain (or identity provider) are granted access to the services of the other 
enterprises (or service providers). Federated identity management refers to the set of 
business agreements, technical agreements and policies that enable companies to become 
partners. This lowers their overall identity management costs, improves the user 
experience and mitigates security risks in web service-based interactions. 
Web service-federation defines mechanisms for brokering and federating trust, 
identity and claims. Federation is the overall term for a set of distinct, heterogeneous 
enterprises that want to provide an easy-to-use, single sign-on identity model to their 
users. Single sign-on means that after a user signs-on with one member of the federation, 
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he can interact with other members without re-authentication. Enterprises can be 
corporate entities, internet service providers or associations of individuals. A federated 
environment differs from a traditional single sign-on environment in that there are no 
established rules limiting how enterprises transfer information about a user. However, 
there might be an established business policy for an enterprise’s participation in the 
federation, much like there is today when companies decide to do business together. 
Several limitations of the existing web service-federation specification have been 
identified. These limitations involve methods for establishing trust relationships, 
brokering and federating trust, publishing security policies, enforcing security 
requirements and exchanging security tokens. Considering the large number of 
participants interacting in a fully distributed web service system, it is impractical for 
entities to establish and to maintain explicit trust relationships with every customer and 
partner. While the web service-security framework describes how to specify trust 
policies, how to communicate trust and how to broker trust directly and indirectly 
through third-parties, it leaves the method for originating a trust policy to the organisation 
or the web service administrator. While it is constructive for the specifications to remain 
implementation independent, entities still need a basis for initially defining and 
subsequently maintaining their trust policies. If a service potentially acquires a large 
number of clients in a complex distributed system, then a web service designer or policy 
administrator must identify method(s) of practically enumerating all possible trust 
relationships with the different clients or their respective organisations (Van Dyke, 2004). 
Without having a process to establish trust relationships dynamically, it is difficult for 
entities to fully benefit from the loosely coupled, distributed nature of large-scale web 
service networks (WSN). 
Web service-federation does not specify how security token exchanges can occur, 
given potential differences in the various domains’ methods for authenticating users and 
services. Moreover, the specification does not suggest strategies for establishing trust 
relationships between entities, for mapping differences in the trustworthiness of security 
tokens across domains, and designating authorities to maintain and to publish security 
definitions and requirements (Van Dyke, 2004). Current research suggests advanced 
approaches for designing dynamic web service trust networks that confront these issues. 
Specifically, it discusses how additional primary concepts (such as trust levels, trust 
groups and trust authorities) can enhance existing web service-* security specifications. 
Trust levels can be thought of as mutually recognised, standardised identifiers of the 
‘level of trustworthiness’ for a given user or service. For example, an entity that interacts 
with a user who holds an authentication ticket signed by one of its trusted partners should 
be able to trust this user to some degree, as outlined by the entity’s trust policy. With 
these additions, systems can define dynamic trust policies and generate dynamic trust 
relationships. It is worth mentioning that proponents of web service believe that new web 
service technologies will expand federation as it exists for ATM networks into a 
generalised architecture that is applicable for many types of internet communications. 
3 Platforms for security solutions 
Web service-security specifications do not make network-layer or host-based security 
mechanisms unnecessary within a service-oriented communications framework, but only 
limit their role. A complete security solution should include multiple platforms. We will 
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follow the path of a web service request message in the sample configuration of Figure 3, 
to illustrate an indicative way to combine the responsibilities of the various security 
platforms-solutions (Kaye, 2003). 
? Data of critical importance, with high-level requirements for confidentiality and 
integrity, must be encrypted using host-based (or application-based) security 
mechanisms. By performing encryption (at requestor’s side) and decryption 
(at provider’s side) as close to the application as possible, data integrity and 
confidentiality are protected over the greatest percentage of its route. This platform is 
capable to perform more granular authentication and authorisation than is possible in 
the XML/application firewall. 
? The XML/application firewall verifies XML syntax and checks documents against 
business rules. Moreover, it authenticates and verifies the authorisations of entities 
submitting external requests. Finally, it may encrypt data of less importance. 
Because it is separate from the web service, the XML firewall is able to provide 
security for multiple web service applications. By handling all encryption and 
decryption tasks, it provides a complete set of integrity and confidentiality services 
covering both component-level issues and end-to-end issues for multi-hop systems. It 
may perform authentication tasks at multiple levels, including multi-party and bi-
directional authentications. Since it may read the content of web service messages, 
and to authenticate their authors, XML firewall is the ultimate authorisation 
mechanism: it may support loosely coupled authorisation models and it may include 
sophisticated rules-based engines to express complex authorisation logic. 
? Between the network firewalls of the web service endpoints and the WSN, virtual 
private networks (VPNs) are implemented which have the primary responsibility for 
the integrity and confidentiality of data as it passes through the internet. Network 
firewalls and their network-layer security offer simple and effective transport-layer 
encryption for either temporary (using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol), or 
persistent (using VPN mechanisms) point-to-point connections. To establish a VPN, 
considerable business and technical negotiations between the parties are required. 
But even then, only a part of the web service-security challenges are solved: simple 
point-to-point links are used only by web service without intermediaries. Thus, 
network firewalls and VPNs can only play supporting roles for integrity, 
confidentiality and authentication. They cannot provide end-to-end related security 
attributes in a multi-hop architecture. Moreover, network firewalls are intended to 
prevent access and to hide systems, whereas web service requires the exposition to 
the outside world of those very same systems. In web service, as the web service 
architecture layers indicate, the general goal is to move security out of the lower 
network and transport-layers and into the upper message-oriented layers. This allows 
security concepts to be implemented independently of any particular network or 
transport protocol. Network- and transport-independent security is required for any 
message that will be routed over more than one protocol on the way to its final 
destination. 
? The WSN offers security qualities as centralised and shared third-party services. It 
provides the transformation services that make one endpoint compatible with 
another. Examples of such mapping services are the selectively decryption of 
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received data, its re-encryption and re-transmission to the destination endpoint. Other 
services are logging data for non-repudiation purposes and 
authentication/authorisation functions if the two endpoints use different models and 
therefore require mediation. This is essentially the platform in which the 
sophisticated web service-security specifications of the previous paragraph are 
implemented. 
? One alternative to deploying security solutions is using peripheral systems which are 
not part of the web service message path. Peripheral-service security solutions 
provide mainly authentication and authorisation as services (even as web service). 
Characteristic examples are: centralised identity management systems, sharing 
schemes of identities among business partners and general purpose authentication 
engines that support complex rules expressed in standardised XML. 
Figure 3 Distributing the responsibilities of security platforms 
Source: Kaye (2003). 
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4 Implementing a web service on an Apache server 
A simple web service implementation project was undertaken to assess the suitability of 
development tools and the level of security that can be achieved with standard 
development environments and techniques. This case is only discussed here from the 
point of view of security features implemented and how the tools used supported the 
requirements for web service-security. 
4.1 Development tools utilised 
In deciding on the choice of tools, Open Source software was compared and contrasted to 
those offered by major brand tools – primarily Microsoft products. The final choice was 
the Linux operating system with Apache web server, PHP 5 server side script language 
and MySQL database. 
The main reasons for such a choice are as follows. 
? Open source programs usually come with wide community support. Linux has an 
established reputation for high reliability and low hardware requirement and 
installation is quick and trouble free. 
? Apache web server is one of the oldest and most commonly used server side 
development environments. It is easy and simple to configure and very stable. It also 
supports SSL which is of prime importance to web service applications. 
? PHP has legendary compatibility with a huge range of operation systems. It also has 
a lot of additional modules. Version 5 of PHP offers high-level of support for object 
orientation, which is very useful in building applications in modular mode, as web 
services often need to expand and diversify. 
? Finally, the selected database is MySQL. The choice of the newest version of 
MySQL which has almost the same features as the PostgreSQL was based on the fact 
that it is faster when handling simple queries. 
4.2 Security features at registration 
The registration is fast and simple with signed mandatory fields to identify those user’s 
details that the user must give for the registration. These are standard details such as the 
username and the e-mail address. The given username is checked by the system to make 
sure that it constitutes a unique identifier for the user, so that each registered user has his 
or her own, individual identification in the database. Following this simple validation 
stage, the system adds the new user’s details to the database and generates a random 
password. This password is sent to the registered user’s e-mail address, and then the 
encrypted version of this password is stored in the database. For security reasons, pure 
text passwords are not stored anywhere. In this case, it is not possible to recover the 
original password because the used encryption method is a one way routine (common 
md5 encryption is used). The registered user will not have permission to use the system 
until the administrator changes his or her status from the default passive state to active 
(Figure 4). 
      
      
   250 E. Pimenidis and C.K. Georgiadis    
      
      
      
Figure 4 Registration page with choice of language (see online version for colours) 
The user level is identified by a flag system in the database. After the registration process 
is finished, the new user will be assigned the lowest user level status, signed with 
an ‘R’ – flag (registered). On this level, the users have access to the web service and can 
login to the user interface to get information about the current services and handle 
personal details. 
The second level users can be assigned to is ‘A’ – flag (approved). It means that they 
have been granted privileges to add or modify the services (the user must know the MIGs 
of the input and the output to add or modify a service) and also all the options as the users 
on the lower level. 
The highest level is identified by an ‘S’ – flag (site administrator), it means these 
users have permission to all lower level features and also user administration privileges. 
4.3 Transaction security – session authentication 
The above user policy system needs a strong authentication module to achieve the main 
objective; therefore, a number of controls are used during the login and for the period of 
the session. A separate database table is used to log the session details. At login, the 
user’s internet protocol address and the user agent are checked. A time limit is also 
assigned for the user login and automatically finishes the session when it expires caused 
by inactivity. During the time of active connections, the time limit renews itself. 
To use the web service requires authentication, which is sent at the beginning of the 
session. As soon as the verification is complete, the service sends a session ID to the 
client. This password is valid for the started session and identifies the user. The client 
sends back this authentication information to the server at all times when it is sending a 
request to the server. The system is also protected from SQL injection (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 Transaction authentication schema 
Since messaging itself does not provide secure transmission protocol, it brings high risks 
to both sides of the message exchange. Although traditional security technologies such as 
SSL and HTTPS can partially resolve this problem by encrypting messages transferred 
between two points, these point-to-point security technologies cannot ensure end-to-end 
security along the entire path from client to a web service in a complicated multi-tiered 
distributed system (Tang et al., 2006). 
The web service has its own database to store translation methods, which can be used 
once the request reaches the service. 
The service receives the request and identifies the ‘method ID’. This ID comes by the 
first transaction, at the same time as the authentication information sent to the service. 
The system uses XML language to send these data and authenticate the session. 
5 Conclusions 
Web services are the current trend in establishing diverse environments for offering a 
choice to recipients and a plethora of potential customers to participants. Amongst the 
key desirable features of web services, security is the most critical and most sensitively 
balanced one: it must not be compromised, but at the same time must be implemented in 
such a way that it does not degrade the performance and undermine the interoperability of 
the service. These three properties of a web service are central to achieving the two major 
objectives of web service providers, to establish and maintain trust of recipients and to 
reach high volumes of users. 
A variety of frameworks for implementation and evaluation of the level of security 
offered exist. The key in addressing the security requirements of a web service is in the 
trade offs in terms of performance and complexity of recipient participation. The simple 
implementation case discussed here demonstrates that commonly available tools can be 
utilised in web service implementation projects with good results in meeting desired 
security requirements. The honours are on the service orchestrator to ensure that the 
above three requirements are evenly balanced without any compromises in security. 
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